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Abstract 
The refinancing of  PFI (Private Finance Initiative) projects currently represents one 
of the most contentious aspects of Public Private Partnership in the UK.   The 
negative publicity associated with UK PFI refinancing deals is associated with two 
main factors,  namely evidence of massive private sector profit making in connection 
with past refinancing deals, and the ‘failure’ of private sector financiers to share 
refinancing profits with public sector organisations in line with government 
recommendations.   This paper examines the ongoing ‘dance of non-regulation’ 
associated with PFI refinancing on the basis of traditional Marxist notions of 
‘contradictions of capitalism’.  Our analysis commences with the argument that PFI 
represents a prototypical case of an alliance between finance capital and the state, 
which has been created with the principal purpose of establishing a new source of 
profits for the private sector.  A Marxist analysis of state-business relationships would 
predict such an alliance to show tendencies towards instability which could arise from 
a number of factors.   These include, among others, the inherent lack of legitimacy of 
such an alliance vis a vis established policy goals and the stakeholders associated with 
them; a lack of a credible regulatory framework which, as a systemic prerequisite of 
private sector profit making, further exacerbates existing problems of legitimation; 
and, perhaps most importantly, the potentially self-defeating attempt by capital to 
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maximise gains from the exploitation of the existing alliance without concern for the 
possibility of a political or regulatory backlash.  Examining the recent history of PFI 
refinancing we find evidence of most of these destabilising tendencies which we 
expect to trigger calls for a greater regulation of PFI projects in the future. 
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Introduction 
The establishment of PFI as a form of infrastructure financing is closely linked to the 
emergence of neo-liberal policy agendas in the early 1980s; albeit that PFI based 
procurement in the UK itself has only taken on significant proportions in the late 
1990s. Accordingly, several researchers have argued that PFI is linked to a process 
whereby governments, which themselves have created fiscal pressures, adopt PFI as a 
means of tapping into global surplus capital (Cohn, 2004). This interpretation of a 
state-led financial transformation of public service provision, however, leaves much 
to be desired, because it fails to explain why this transformation is occurring at this 
late stage of neo-liberal policy making and it does not explain important features of 
PFI arrangements, such as the lack of financial accountability. 
An alternative, and perhaps more credible, explanation for the emergence of 
PFI is one in which finance capital is itself seen as the driver for the creation of PFI 
with the state acting as facilitator and broker (Asenova and Beck, 2006). This 
explanation for the evolution of PFI assumes that this form of procurement emerged 
primarily as a response to the desire of global finance capital to balance its portfolio 
with lower risk/ lower return investments in relatively stable regions. Accordingly, 
PFI’s principal function is not merely to provide infrastructure, but to act as a state-
sponsored investment opportunity for surplus capital. As a consequence both state and 
finance capital face several problems, investigated below, of instability, legitimation 
and accountability. 
Examining the recent history of PFI refinancing, this paper argues that, as one 
of the most controversial aspects of PFI procurement, refinancing illustrates the latent 
tendency of business state alliances towards instability. Specifically, we argue that 
refinancing highlights the lack of feasibility of a market-based form of governance, in 
which the state abrogates part of its traditional responsibilities in order to create new 
profit opportunities for the private sector. Our argument proceeds in four stages. 
Section one develops a theoretical framework and propositions for the purposes of 
assessing the evidence. Section two briefly discusses the mechanics of PFI 
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refinancing. Section three analyses the contradictory attitudes of the UK government 
toward refinancing. Section four examines the tendency of private financiers to 
maximize profits from refinancing despite government appeals for moderation. 
Section five discusses two case studies of PFI refinancing which illustrate the 
dominance of private sector interests in these transactions.  Section six concludes by 
examining the possibility of greater PFI regulation in the UK.  
 
The theory of finance capital and the Private Finance Initiative 
According to Kolko (1963, p.3) corporate behaviour towards the political sector is 
conditioned by a demand for economic ‘rationalisation’, which creates long run 
opportunities for stable profit making. Miliband’s (1969) analysis of imperfect 
competition and monopoly regulation, for instance, notes that much regulation 
designed for this purpose, both in the UK and US, was not conducted in an 
adversarial context, but had rather developed into loose alliance monopoly capitalists 
and monopoly regulators. What is interesting in Miliband’s analysis, however, is not 
so much the suggestion that business regulation tends to serve business, but rather the 
notion that, like capitalism itself, such alliances tend to suffer from contradictions 
which manifest themselves in the form of several sources of instability. Specifically, 
the stability and profitability imperatives are impeded by the dynamic instability of 
the social structure of accumulation, global surplus capital and the related imposition 
of hard capital rationing on government expenditure. Each of these instabilities 
explains the origins and character of privatisation programmes in general, and the 
experience of the public finance initiative in Britain in particular. Each, discussed in 
turn below, leads to research propositions concerning the experience of PFI.   
The social structure of accumulation (Gordon et al 1982) is explained in terms 
of phases of exploration, growth and decay. It is during the decay-exploration phase 
that firms lobby governments most heavily and, where successful, increase the 
prominence of the state but reduce its autonomy, so that lobbyists are able to access 
the bureaucratic elements of the state rather than work through its political institutions 
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(Prechel, 2000, pp.173-74). The consequence of these interactions is that, in the first 
phase, corporations are able successfully to exploit knowledge asymmetries 
associated with commercial practice at the expense of bureaucrats trained in state 
planning functions. In the subsequent phase the bureaucrats themselves are 
commercialised in their attitudes and priorities. 
The invasion of the state bureaucracy by the dictates of commercialism has its 
most recent origins in the creation of global surplus capital. Rapid accumulation of 
financial capital as a ratio to GDP since the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, the 
oil price shock of 1973 and the subsequent removal of almost all significant 
limitations on international movements of capital threaten to depress the rate of 
return, unless institutional arrangements can be secured to guarantee higher rates of 
return. Simultaneously, the requirement for stability against a backdrop of instable 
international financial markets (Strange, 1998) leads to a search for low risk 
investments. It is precisely such investment opportunities that characterise 
privatisation deals in under-developed countries and elsewhere as well as the 
activities of large multinational corporations, whose activies are associated with high 
return low risk contractual arrangements and the possibility of an intense political 
backlash (Toms, 2006).1 High return low risk investment opportunities are a 
characteristic of market failure consistent with a Ricardian model of rent 
appropriation, in this case at the expense of the state and ultimately the taxpayer. At 
the same time, contradictions associated with disequilibria in the rate of profit 
(Hilferding, [1910] (1981)) are deepened by the negotiation of bilaterally based 
contracts between corporations and the state. In the absence of a regulatory 
framework to protect the interests of total social capital from the actions of individual 
capitalist, such disequilibria create the risk of a destabilising political opposition. 
                                                 
1 For example the case of the privatisation of the Bolivian water industry, in which the 
risk of a new dam project in Bolivia risk was transferred from the shareholders of 
Bechtel onto the Bolivian people via increased water charges (Palast, 2003, pp.173-
81). 
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At the same time the prospects of such a political backlash are increased by 
the financially constrained position of governmental organisations. The rise of 
financial capitalism has imposed strict limits on levels of direct investment conducted 
by the state itself (Pilling, 1996). As a consequence, the infrastructure of public 
service provision enters the decay phase and governments face political pressure to 
respond to investment requirements under conditions of capital rationing. It would be 
expected that under such conditions, the cost of capital to the borrower increases, 
thereby creating a problem of legitimation for the state, which has the opportunity to 
use its own resources and raise money at a cheaper risk free rate, and for the corporate 
investor, which stands to be accused of profiteering. In the former case, the state can 
mitigate legitimacy problems by using the taxation and public finance system to 
prevent increased financing charges impacting on the direct cost of services at the 
point of use. Nonetheless, as a consequence it has an interest in disguising the 
underlying financial fundamentals of off-balance sheet deals. As far as the private 
sector is concerned, there are potentially very serious legitimacy problems which can 
be overcome only by avoiding disclosure of profits on very lucrative contracts, or by 
exaggerating the level of risk associated with the investment. 
 Summarising the above arguments in terms of PFI, specific, these sources of 
instability are threefold. First, problems of legitimation which result directly from the 
state prioritising business interests over those of the public, and in so doing 
externalises additional costs of private sector activity to the public (an example of this 
being the excessive costs of some PFI projects). Second, a lack of regulatory 
consistency which arises from the fact that private sector profit making in such 
ventures crucially depends on the absence of appropriate control and regulation 
(which is applied elsewhere to public sector activities). Third, the inherent tendency 
of the private sector  to exploit the newly created profit opportunities beyond what is 
politically and economically feasible in the long run (thus creating the possibility of a 
political and/or regulatory backlash). Each of these propositions is investigated 
empirically below. 
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The Mechanics of PFI Refinancing 
PFI projects are financed through a large proportion of bank debt or bonds (typically 
around 90% of the capital requirement) and equity finance, primarily in the form of 
subscription to shares in the project company.  The precise financial structure of these 
projects is usually shaped by private sector companies and the party which acts as the 
project’s loan arranger or financial advisor to the project company.  The objective of 
these arrangements is to ensure such financial arrangements which will guarantee that 
the project’s financial requirements will be met and the shareholders will receive 
profits.  The financing costs of the PFI projects are determined by various factors 
such as the project’s scope and scale, the economic and market conditions, the credit 
reputation and rating of the borrower, etc. and are closely associated with the 
project’s risk profile. 
The key risks involved in a PFI project include the risk of the project 
collapsing before the debt repayment and the risk of inaccurate revenue forecasts 
(Allen, 2001). Due to a less than obvious interplay of factors and difficulties in 
measuring these risks, cost evaluations associated with different methods of 
borrowing can be very imprecise, which is one of the factors which gives rise to the 
possibility of refinancing.   
As a financial transaction, refinancing has become popular in the UK 
primarily on account of the willingness of government organizations to make it work.  
However, the very fact that refinancing exists paradoxically raises concerns about the 
nature of PFI contracts.  Among other things, the large investor returns which were 
generated by the refinancing of some early PFI projects indicate that such basic 
fundamentals of PFI transactions as the pricing structure are frequently inaccurate 
(HM Treasury, 2007).   
Today, refinancing is considered particularly suitable for projects where the 
construction phase has been completed and the operational phase is demonstrably 
successful.  The risk profile of such projects is significantly less critical and revenues 
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can be forecast more accurately.  Refinancing, however, often increases the risk borne 
by the public sector, for example, in situations where equity is replaced by debt.  This 
has led several observers to argue in favour of equal sharing of the financial gains.  
During the recent decade it has become obvious that PFI is not necessarily the 
cheapest procurement option available to the government departments (Robinson, 
2000).  The UK government can borrow money at lower cost compared to private 
firms (Allen, 2001), on account of its access to the National Loans Fund (NLF)2 
which is maintained by tax contributions and is a cheap, virtually risk free, financing 
option. Following  the introduction of the new Prudential Borrowing Framework in 
2003, local authorities have been encouraged to borrow money in a more flexible way 
and to repay capital expenditure borrowing from their future revenue streams.  
Currently both forms for financing local authorities capital expenditure exists in 
parallel. 
Apart from questions about the efficacy of PFI as a borrowing tool, the 
financing and refinancing aspects of PFI continue to attract a lot of controversy, 
mainly due to the often disproportionate refinancing gains made by the private sector 
companies and, by implication, damage to the public interest. Some commentators 
and government watchdogs have been referring to refinancing as the “unacceptable 
face of the capitalism” (HM Treasury, 2006; Settle, 2006).  While refinancing is a 
common practice for long-term public sector projects, in non-PFI finance the public 
sector is the single beneficiary. By contrast, in the case of PFI refinancing, the main 
beneficiary so far has been the private sector.  In other words, many PFI refinancing 
deals appear to have been little more than a vehicle for a direct transfer of money 
from the public purse to the private investors.   
 
UK Government Attitudes towards PFI Refinancing 
The refinancing of PFI projects involves a reconsidering of the project features 
according to which the loan was initially provided. The HM Treasury’s 
                                                 
2 The NLF is a government account opened in 1968 through which pass most of the government 
borrowing transactions and some domestic lending transactions. 
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Standardisation of PFI Contracts (Version 3) (2004: 254) defines refinancing as 
follows: 
During the life of the Project, the Contractor may wish to replace, augment 
or change the structure, nature or terms of the financing solution that it put in 
place at Financial close for the purposes of financing the Project.  Where 
such restructuring changes will have the effect of increasing or accelerating 
distribution to investors or of reducing their commitment to the Project, these 
effects are individually or collectively referred to as Refinancing Gains. 
The same document provides explicit encouragement to the authorities to approve and 
endorse such arrangements (HM Treasury, 2004: 255): 
Refinancing of PFI projects is one way in which both the Authority and 
investors in the Contractor can share in the benefits of a successful project.  
Accordingly, Authorities should be receptive to proposals from the 
Contractor to refinance, and are encouraged to consent to such proposals. 
An earlier version of this guidance (TTF, 1999: 85-86) had gone even further in 
supporting refinancing by advising that “restricting the ability of the Contractors to 
refinance will severely limit their ability to innovate at the bid stage”. These 
‘encouragements’ have to be seen in the light of the public sector authorities’ right to 
refuse consent for refinancing in situations where the proposed financial structure is 
perceived as being potentially restrictive and reducing the flexibility of existing 
arrangements.  As many  well-publicised cases indicate, this has rarely happened but 
it appears that given its continuing commitment to PFI, the UK government is 
actively seeking to prevent activities which could dampen the private sector’s 
enthusiasm for this type of investment.  
 Increasing the level of senior debt is crucial for ensuring the involvement of 
the private sector companies in refinancing activities. Treasury guidance documents 
have been discouraging, but not prohibitive, of such practices (HM Treasury, 2004: 
256): 
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Increases in Senior Debt for a PFI project, whether through the Contractor or 
otherwise having security (or other rights) over and/or recourse to the assets, 
contracts or cash-flows of the Contractor, beyond the original capital value of 
the Project should not be approved by the Authority without it first seeking 
appropriate professional advice. 
The key components of refinancing can include alterations in financial parameters 
such as interest rates, repayment dates, margins and/or the level of senior debt, at 
which the loan was provided in the original contract as well as the release of 
contingent junior capital (TTF, 1999; HM Treasury, 2004).   
 Following bad publicity in relation to some earlier refinancing arrangements 
(Anon, 2006; Hencke, 2007; Rozenberg, 2006; Russell, 2007; Settle, 2006; Timmins, 
2006, HM Treasury, 2006), the government has attempted to provide guidance on 
how these transactions should be structured.  References to refinancing were first 
made in the publication ‘Guidance on the Standardisation of PFI Contracts’ (OGC, 
1999) and subsequently revised (OGC, 2001).  As a minimum, this early guidance 
recommends that the client’s consent be gained prior to refinancing. At the same time, 
the guidance maintains that, even in the absence of formal provisions, the public 
sector should share benefits.  According to the Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC, 2001), refinancing profits should compensate parties for risks taken during the 
construction phase.  Therefore the benefits should be shared on equal basis between 
the public and the private sectors.   
The requirement for equal shares (50:50) has been disputed by many private 
sector companies, which believed that they should receive higher proportion from the 
profits (e.g. 75:25) as a reflection of the actual risk distribution.  It is easy to see the 
lack of logic in this argument. The risk of a project is embedded in its underlying cash 
flows, not in how those cash flows are shared between contributing classes of finance, 
a view shared by Marx, (1984, ch XII) and Modigliani and Miller (1958). In other 
words the lobbying process can be seen as an attempt to establish differential profit 
rates to the advantage of the private sector. It is also a process in which the private 
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sector havs experienced considerable successes. In 2001, when an attempt was made 
to establish new regulations regarding the conditions for refinancing, approval by 
private sector parties became subject to intensive negotiations.  In July 2002 the body 
commissioned with this task, the OGC, published for the first time its revised 
guidance to the public sector authorities stipulating that in all new PFI contracts the 
refinancing gains should be equally distributed between the public and the private 
sector partners (HM Treasury, 2003).   
The second important outcome of these consultations was that the private 
sector agreed to adopt a voluntary code for sharing the gains from earlier PFI 
contracts (i.e. contracts signed up to 30 September 2002) which otherwise did not 
contain explicit arrangements regarding the refinancing.  The introduction of this 
voluntary code was considered an important achievement in light of the fact that early 
PFI projects were likely to have the greatest potential for refinancing (NAO, 2006).  
According to this voluntary code, the public sector was entitled to no more than 30% 
share of the refinancing gains, which was considered “the best it [OGC] could have 
achieved” (HM Treasury, 2003: 7).  The argument put forward for this decision 
reflects the government’s own perception that the balance of power within the PFI 
scene is distributed overwhelmingly in favour of the private sector (HM Treasury, 
2003: 7):  
To have sought more would have increased the risks that the private sector 
would not agree to the code or would seek to avoid complying with it. 
Overall the UK government’s approaches to the regulation of refinancing have been 
characterised by a continued unwillingness to recognise the failure of voluntary 
approaches to as well as a readiness to sacrifice public gains to private profiteers.  It 
can be argued that this ‘dance of non-regulation’ is a direct reflection of the 
contradictions which have arisen in connection with the invasion of the state 
bureaucracies by the commercial interests of PFI financiers.  Thus, there is an 
imperative for the state to benefit from the gains of PFI refinancing, yet there is also 
the currently more powerful imperative to allow private sector financiers to draw 
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extraordinary profits from the venture, so as to ensure their future involvement in PFI 
projects.   These two goals are difficult to resolve, and probably are only likely to 
receive a resolution when sufficient political, or fiscal, momentum is mobilised to 
stop the existing pattern of collusion.  
 
The Reality of PFI Refinancing 
Notwithstanding the adequacy of the 30% share, it has to be noted that, prior to the 
introduction of the voluntary code and the new guidance on refinancing, the private 
sector companies showed very little concern for the interests of the taxpayer. Table 1 
shows the proportion of contracts allocated with reference to the thresholds discussed 
above  in the periods before and after June 2000.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Despite increased voluntary regulation of refinancing deals, they continue to be, by 
the government’s own admission, riddled with problems. One of the most important 
recent allegations relates to the level of disclosure of the precise scale of the 
refinancing benefits.  Information in the press quotes Edward Leigh, Chairman of the 
Commons Public Accounts Committee referring to “obscene” rates of return 
(Timmins, 2006) as well as his concern that due to the lack of transparency and full 
disclosure the real profits can be “even more grotesque”.  Leigh warned that some 
contractors may have to be called to provide an explanation of controversial 
refinancing deals to the members of the Parliament.  Some of the key PFI players that 
have failed to provide their refinancing figures including Balfour Beatty, Barclays 
Capital, Jarvis, Laing Investment, etc.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, some public sector 
authorities have been equally reluctant to provide details on refinancing deals.  For 
example, in November 2006, NHS Lothian refused to disclose the financial details 
related to the refinancing of one of its early flagship PFI projects - the Edinburgh 
Royal Infirmary, which has been surrounded by controvery over the recent years.  In 
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response to critics pointing out the possibility that the costs of the new deal are likely 
to exceed the original (already high) costs of the project, the Trust responded with 
vague reassurances that the deal was “commercially confidential” and will “deliver 
multi-million pound gains” for the local users (Settle, 2006).  
The most recent Report of the Committee of Public Accounts (HM Treasury, 
2007)  indicates that, while the Treasury had been aware for some time of the 
potential problems with excessive private sector gains, it was reluctant to intervene 
with measures which “might affect the private sector’s interest in bidding for the early 
PFI contracts” (HM Treasury, 2007: 7). According to a report produced by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, the four projects with the highest rates of increase 
in their investors’ internal rate of return on refinancing include the Debden Park 
School, the Norfolk & Norwich Hospital, the Bromley Hospital and the Darren Valley 
Hospital (see Table 2).  Those, and other, examples indicate that the voluntary code 
has effectively failed to generate the expected benefits for the public purse (Russell, 
2007). 
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In the absence of proper sharing arrangements, the favourable conditions introduced 
through the refinancing of some projects have often resulted in excessive rates of 
return to the shareholders, which even key government sources have described as  
undermining public interest and jeopardising the achievement of value for money 
VFM (HM Treasury, 2007; NAO 2006).  Thus the NAO’s most recent report 
specifically notes that  the large refinancing gains, combined with the increased risk 
taken by the public sector, put to question the VFM even in cases when some sharing 
of the gains takes place (NAO, 2006).   
Following the transfer of responsibility for the PFI policy from OGC to the 
Treasury in April 2003, there has been a decline of the debt refinancing activities, 
which is largely due to the increased emphasis on the observance of the VFM 
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requirement. While some earlier, as well as more recent, guidance documents 
envisage the need for auditing of the project companies’ financial models in relation 
to the refinancing (TTF, 1999; HM Treasury, 2003; HM Treasury, 2004), so far, there 
is no published evidence that such audits have been conducted and that any sanctions 
have been implemented.  
The intricacy and complexity of the refinancing deals provide an excellent 
illustration of the shift in private sector liaison away from the more open political 
process and towards unaccountable asymmetrical bilateralism with the state 
bureaucracy. In itself this is sufficient for a significant transfer of additional risks to 
the public sector. In this context, the Committee of Public Accounts Report (HM 
Treasury, 2003) quotes the results of a survey conducted by the National Audit Office 
in 2001 revealing that alarming 21% of the public sector project teams were 
completely unaware of their current contractor’s financial arrangements including any 
“improvements” of the financing arrangements as well as possible additional risks.  
The NAO noted that of 107 audited PFI transactions only about 25% contained profit-
sharing clauses (Bowman, 2001).  The failure to negotiate such clauses was explained 
by different factors.  Firstly, it has been assumed that the public sector client was 
negligent, and that the advice received from the advisers to the public sector was 
inadequate.  Secondly, it has been argued that, due to unfamiliarity and the uncertain 
risk profile of earlier projects, the banks would not have been willing to accept any 
contractual conditions including profit-sharing clauses.  It has also been argued that, 
since the introduction of PFI in 1992, interest rates have fallen considerably and 
current gains could be merely reflecting that unforeseen fall (HM Treasury, 2003).   
The lack of experience of the public sector has been recognized as another key 
factor contributing, not only to unsound commercial contracts, but also to allowing 
for the disproportionate private sector profits.  The scale of the problem becomes 
apparent in the light of the fact that at present there are around 750 approved PFI 
projects with total costs amounting to £54.5 billion (Hencke, 2007).  The lack of 
commercial awareness of the public sector has been highlighted in the most recent 
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refinancing report produced by the Commons Public Accounts Committee.  The first 
recommendation of this report identifies the lack of commercial awareness of public 
sector local level officials as an important problem, while the second recommendation 
stipulates that the Treasury should approve any refinancing deal which can result in 
substantial private sector gains (HM Treasury, 2007: 5).  The Chairman of the Public 
Accounts Committee has also highlighted the problem with the public sector officials 
“painfully lacking commercial expertise” (Hencke, 2007: 21).   
Staff negotiating the fine print of the refinancing clauses in contracts, where 
the risks to the public sector can be high, must be trained so that they can are 
not outwitted by their commercially sophisticated private sector counterparts. 
Overall, in the PFIs refinanced so far, the private sector has been the primary 
beneficiary to the extent that some official earlier forecasts for the potential benefits 
of the public had to be revised.  According to the OGC’s 2003 analysis, the estimated 
public sector gains from refinancing were between £175 and £200 million.  In 
December 2006 these figures were revised down to around £93 million, where the 
latter figure includes £60 million from hospital deals with augmented, i.e. increased, 
transfers of risk to the public sector (HM Treasury, 2003: 8).  This reduction of the 
actual gains is attributed partially to the possible reluctance of the private to enter into 
new refinancing deals, and partially to the 30% limitation introduced by the voluntary 
code, which does not necessarily take into account the excessive returns realized in 
some cases (HM Treasury, 2007).   
The reduction in the actual amount of gains from refinancing and the transfer 
of additional risks back to the public sector represent only one side of the coin.  
Additional losses for the public can be accrued due to the  method of payment of the 
public sector share.  According to the existing regulation the public sector can acquire 
the refinancing gains in three possible ways including a) as a lump sum, b) through a 
reduction of the unitary charge over the life of the contract, or c) by a combination of 
the first two options (HM Treasury, 2003; HM Treasury, 2004; HM Treasury, 2007).  
While the private sector always takes its share as a lump sum, the public sector 
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typically accepts the added uncertainty associated with long-term payments.  
Therefore, in case of financial difficulties experienced by the private sector 
contractors, which is not unlikely considering the long duration of the contacts, or in 
case of complete failure of private companies to honour their contractual 
commitments, the public sector will not only have the ultimate responsibility for the 
service provision, but it will also lose partially or entirely its refinancing gains.  
Similarly, if over time the service becomes obsolete and the project is terminated 
early, the public sector will be unable to materialize the expected gains.  In addition, 
it remains uncertain whether accelerated investors gains occurring early on during the 
life of the contract will act as a disincentive, which will be affect the quality of the 
services provided to the public (NAO, 2006).  There is no doubt that this whole 
arrangement contains a myriad of loopholes with potentially damaging consequences 
for the public interest.    
Apart from reflecting the previously discussed fundamental contradictions of 
PFI as a form of commercial invasion of the state bureaucracy, the current practise of 
refinancing reveals another dimension of  this interaction, namely, the tendency of the 
private sector to obfuscate its profits and the willingness of the state to collude with 
these actions at least in the short run.   Again, there is reason to argue that such a 
strategy itself carries significant potential towards instability, primarily because it is 
unlikely, as recent events already illustrate, that excessive private sector profits can be 
hidden from the public gaze for any length of time.    
 
Case Studies 
The following brief case studies of refinancing deals illustrate the mechanisms by 
which private sector investors have multiplied their benefits by achieving increased 
profits for a project with a lower risk profile, while the public sector has been forced 
to accept higher risks and higher costs.   Additionally they illustrate the contradictory 
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attitude of government agencies who have taken a critical attitude towards these deals 
while failing to create an adequate regulatory framework for preventing undesirable 
outcomes.  
 
Case one – the refinancing of Fazakerley Prison 
One early refinancing deal which highlighted the lucrative potential of the PFI was 
related to the Fazakerley Prison PFI contract in Liverpool.  The contract between the 
Prison Service and Fazakerley Prison Services Ltd (Carillon and Group 4) was signed 
in 1995 and included 25 years concession period.  According to the report produced 
by NAO (NAO, 2000: para 2.1): 
The refinancing of the Fazakerly prison contract is one example of how 
shareholders can extract financial benefits both earlier and in greater quantity 
than the expected benefits originally disclosed in their consortium bid. 
The project was initially financed through a loan of £92.5 million, arranged by ABN 
Auto and Halifax.  In November 1999, following successful construction, early 
completion (four months ahead) and two years of operation, the prison contract was 
refinanced.  The refinancing resulted in significant benefits to the shareholders in 
terms of early debt repayment and higher dividend flows (Allen, 2001).  The terms of 
the refinancing (NAO, 2000) included i) a decreased lending loan margin3, ii) an 
extension of the initial re-payment period from 19 to 22 years, iii) the arrangement of 
fixed rate of interests for the full period of the loan and iv) the early repayment of the 
subordinated debt to the shareholders.   
The new financing terms inevitably increased the risk to the public sector as in certain 
contract terminations circumstances the Prison Service had to pay off the debt.  While 
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the original project contract did not include provisions for sharing refinancing 
benefits, the private sector lenders required the formal consent from the client.  The 
consent was backed up by a recognition of the private sector’s successful project 
management as well as being seen as an incentive for future private sector 
involvement in projects PFI.  Post refinancing, the rate of return for the consortium 
increased from 12.8% to 39%, raising cash profit by 80% (NAO, 2000).  In order to 
compensate for the increased risks associated with the refinancing, the client (the 
Prison Service) received £1 million from a total of £10.7 million refinancing revenue.  
This compensation was negotiated only after the previous lower private sector offers 
(for £100,000 and £300,000) had been rejected.   
 Notably, while this PFI contract did not require the agreement of the public 
sector for refinancing, it did require its consent for changes which could potentially 
increase the termination liabilities, i.e. the payments which the client had to make if 
the contract was terminated prematurely.  According to the NAO, the financiers were 
also concerned that, if the private sector proceeded with the refinancing without the 
explicit agreement of the Prison Service, this could potentially jeopardize the payment 
of the termination liabilities (NAO, 2000). 
 The NAO (2000) inquiry identified a number of lessons, which could be 
drawn from this refinancing deal.  The included:  
 • At the project planning stage, the client should consider the potential for 
refinancing gains and their right to share them. 
 • The refinancing profit should benefit the parties according to the degree of 
their risk bearing. 
                                                                                                                                            
3 The loan margin was decreased from 150 basic points to 70 basic points for the initial five years, and 
90 basic points for the rest of the time (Bowman 2001).   
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 • The VFM needs to be preserved in refinancing transactions. 
 • The contractual terms have to stipulate under what circumstances the client’s 
consent for refinancing should be required. 
 • Expert legal and financial advice should be sought, with the experts’ payments 
being linked to the outcome of the negotiations. 
 • The long-term contractual relations between the parties should be maintained. 
Despite its criticism of the Fazakerley deal, the NAO’s analysis failed to recognise the 
need for an improved regulatory framework which would ensure a better articulation 
of the public sector’s financial interests.  This was particularly surprising in light of a 
series of government papers (Bates, 1997; Bates, 1999; Gershon, 1999) and academic 
studies (Asenova and Beck, 2003) which have highlighted the difficulties public 
sector clients encounter when negotiating complex financial arrangements.  
Partly as a consequence of this lack of regulation, the press has reported a 
series of refinancing deals in which the private sector has been able to achieve 
significant windfall profits.   These include the Norfolk & Norwich hospital project, 
with estimated windfalls to the private sector in the range of £70 million; the Dartford 
and Graveshend hospital, with gains around £20 million; and the Bridgent prison in 
South Wales, with smaller gains of £5 million (Bowman, 2001).   
 
Case  two – the refinancing of the Norfolk & Norwich hospital  
This brief case study looks in more detail at the refinancing of one of the first PFI 
hospitals, the Norfolk & Norwich hospital. The PFI contract between the NHS Trust 
and the private consortia Octagon was signed in January 1998.  It included the 
provision of the hospital buildings as well as their maintenance and facilities 
management over a period of 30 years.  In 2003, two years after the opening of the 
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new hospital, Octagon refinanced the project on such terms which trebled the 
investors’ rate of return, i.e. from 19% in the initial contract to 60% (HM Treasury, 
2006).  The accelerated benefits achieved by Octagon became possible through 
‘optimised’ financing arrangements which included increased borrowing by 53% 
(from £200 million to £306 million) as well as the replacement of the senior bank debt 
repayable in 2018 with bond finance repayable by 2035.    
There were three main factors which  resulted in improved financing terms for 
the private sector.  These included, firstly, the reduction of the project risk following 
the successful completion of the construction phase, secondly, the stabilization of the 
PFI market, and thirdly, the fall of the commercial interest rates.  A report produced 
by the Committee of Public Accounts (HM Treasury, 2006) highlighted the fact that, 
despite the two-year delay before reaching financial closure and the availability of 
newly emerging bond finance, the Trust had failed to request funding competition 
which could have reduced the costs of the finance.  Despite vastly improved financing 
opportunities, the Trust’s gains  from this refinancing deal were a rather modest 29%  
or £34 million.  Perhaps not surprisingly, a Treasury report  pointed out that in this 
deal the private sector’s profits were objectionable by any standards (HM Treasury, 
2006; 4): 
The refinancing produced a balance of risks and awards between the public 
and private sectors which, even for an early PFI deal, is unacceptable. 
When the initial contract was signed the conditions for refinancing had not been 
negotiated by the Trust, although all parties were aware about this possibility.  This 
resulted in disadvantageous starting point during the subsequent refinancing 
negotiations.  The accumulation of errors continued as the Trust failed to avoid the 
increase of the termination liabilities to £257 million.  Considering the increase of the 
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concession period by five years and the difficulty to predict future service needs, this 
failure can be very costly to the Trust in the future.  The report described the Trust 
officials as “too readily agreeing with refinancing proposals” (HM Treasury, 2006; 5) 
and was highly critical of the demonstrable lack of commercial approach among the 
public sector officials (HM Treasury, 2006; 4): 
It is wholly inappropriate that, in the event of termination, the Trust’s 
liabilities could now include not just the cost of the hospital, but all the 
additional borrowing Octagon took on to boost investor’s returns.  It is 
unacceptable that, in the event of termination, the Trust could be left with 
liabilities incurred simply to make it easier for the investors to achieve high 
returns. 
Considering the fact that the early PFI hospital deals were generally characterized by 
high financing costs, the Trust should obviously not have accepted the increased 
termination liabilities (Rozenberg, 2007; Russell, 2007).   However, it is probably 
inappropriate  to blame the public sector alone for an outcome which was ostensibly 
the product of negotiation with its private sector ‘partners’.  
In the case of the refinancing of this hospital, the benefits of the Trust were 
further undermined by the methods of payment of the refinancing benefits.  While the 
investors took their benefits immediately, the Trust accepted a process whereby 
payments to them would be to spread over 35 years as a reduction of the unitary 
charge.  If for any reason there is a decline for some hospital services and the contract 
is terminated early there is a strong possibility that these gains will be lost (Anon, 
2006). 
Overall, there is evidence that, as a result of refinancing, private sector 
investors have been able to multiply their benefits by getting increased profits for a 
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project with lower risk profile, while the public sector has accepted higher risks and 
higher costs.  While it is apparent that the government has not been happy with these 
outcomes, it appears to have failed to create an effective regulatory framework for 
preventing such outcomes, beyond guidance which advises public sector clients to 
include clauses regarding profit-sharing in PFI contracts, should the possibility for 
refinancing arise in the future.  This situation is likely to result in future refinancing 
deals with similarly inequitable outcomes, and carries with it the potential of a 
political backlash, not just against the refinancing of PFI, but also against private 
sector involvement in infrastructure financing in general.     
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the current collaboration of the UK government and 
private financiers around PFI has resulted in contradictory outcomes which endanger 
the stability of this state-business collaboration in the long run.  In reviewing current 
practices of, and government attitudes to, PFI refinancing, we have noted that this 
instability has become particularly pronounced in connection with the question as to 
how gains from refinancing should shared between the public and private sectors.   
 Specifically, the issue of PFI refinancing has given rise to serious problems of 
legitimation, which are related to a situation where the state appears to prioritise 
business interests over those of the public and, in so doing, externalises the costs   
of private sector activity  to the public.   This situation has been aggravated by a lack 
a of regulatory consistency by the UK government itself, where, one the one hand, a 
preference is given to largely ineffective voluntary arrangements, while, on the other 
hand, public sector clients are blamed for ‘undesirable’ outcomes.    One of the 
principal reasons why voluntary arrangement have proven unsatisfactory, meanwhile 
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lies in the fact that the private sector appears to lack the foresight to curb its desire for 
short-term financial gain in order to ensure the sustainability of the existing 
collaboration.   
Given the combination of private sector short-sightedness and public outrage, 
there is every possibility that the status quo of  voluntary ‘regulation’ of PFI 
refinancing cannot be maintained in the in the future.   Whether this will result merely 
in a renewed cycle of PFI regulation, or a more fundamental re-consideration as to 
how the private sector financing of infrastructure can be conducted in a politically and 
socially sustainable manner, however, is difficult to predict.  
 24
References 
Allen, G. (2001) The Private Finance Initiative (PFI), Research Paper 01/117, 
Economics Policy and Statistics Section, London: House of Commons Library. 
Anon, (2006) The Issues Explained, PFI Refinancing, The Times, May 16 2006. 
Asenova, D and Beck, M. (2003) The UK Financial Sector and Risk Management in 
PFI Projects: A Survey, Public Money and Management, 23(3): 195-203.   
Asenova, D. and Beck, M. (2006) The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Finance 
Capital: A Note on Gaps in the “Accountability” Debate, paper for the 2006 
ECAS Conference, York.  
Bates, M. (1997) First review of the PrivateFinanceIinitiative by Sir Malcolm Bates,  
London: HMSO. 
Bates, M. (1999) Second Review of the PrivateFfinance Initiative by Sir Malcolm  
Bates,  London: HMSO. 
Bowman, L. (2001) PFI Fight, Project Finance, Vol 221, pp. 26-28. 
Cohn, D. (2004) The Public Private Partnership “Fetish”: Moving Beyond the Rhetoric, 
Revue Governance, 1(2), Dec 2004. 
Gershon, P. (1999) Review of Civil Procurement in Central Government. Retrieved 
2002 from Office of Government Commerce, Homepage: 
www.ogc.gov.uk/ogc/publications/. 
Gordon, D. Edwards, R. and Reich, M (1982), Segmented Work, Divided Work: The 
Historical Transformation of Labor in The United States, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hencke, D. (2007) Sharp Business People Outwitting Whitehall over PFI Refinancing 
Deals, The Guardian, May 15 2007. 
 25
Hilferding, R. [1910] (1981) Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist 
Development, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  First published in 1910 as 
Das Finanzkapital in Vienna.  
HM Treasury, (2003) House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, PFI 
Refinancing Update, Twenty-second Report of Session 2002-3, London: HM 
Treasury. 
HM Treasury, (2004) Standardisation of PFI Contracts (Version 3), London: HM 
Treasury. . 
HM Treasury, (2006) House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, Refinancing 
of the Norfolk and Norwich PFI Hospital, Thirty-fifth Report of Session 2005-6, 
London: HM Treasury. 
HM Treasury, (2007) House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, Update on 
PFI Debt Refinancing, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2006-7, London: HM 
Treasury.  
Kolko, G (1963), The Triumph of Conservatism, Glencoe: Free Press. 
Marx, K (1984) Capital III, London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
Miliband, R. (1969) The State in Capitalist Society, Basic Books, New York. 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M., (1958), ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and 
the Theory of Investment’, American Economic Review 48, 261-97. 
NAO (2000) The Refinancing of the Fazakerley PFI Prison Contract, Ordered by the 
House of Commons, Prepared by the Controller and the Auditor General, 
London: Stationary Office. 
NAO (2006) Update on PFI Debt Refinancing and the PFI Equity Marke, Ordered by 
the House of Commons, Prepared by the Controller and the Auditor General, 
London, Stationary Office. 
 26
OGC (2001) Office of Government Commerce Guidance for Government Departments: 
Refinancing of PFI Projects, Internet article:  
www.ogc.gov.uk/procurement 
Palast, G., (2003) The Best Democracy Money Can Buy: An Investigative Reporter 
Exposes the Truth About Globalization, Corporate Cons, and High Finance 
Fraudsters, London: Constable & Robinson. 
Pilling, G. (1996) ‘“Globalisation” and the British working class: An essay in economic 
analysis and political prognosis,’ in Brotherstone, T and Pilling, G. (eds) 
History, Economic History and the Future of Marxism: Essays in Memory of 
Tom Kemp, London: Porcupine Press. 
Prechel, H. (2000), Big Business and the State. New York: SUNY Press. 
Rozenberg, G. (2006) Taxpayers Punished by Lack of Deal-Broking Skills at Councils, 
The Times, May 15 2007. 
Russell, B. (2007) City Runs Rings Round Taxpayers in PFI Refinancing, The 
Independent, May 15 2007. 
Settle, M. (2006) PFI Contractors may be Compelled to Reveal Their ‘Obscene’ 
Profits, The Herald, December 29 2006. 
Strange, S. (1998) Mad Money: When Markets Outgrow Governments, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Timmins, N. (2006) Contractors Pressed to Reveal PFI Profits, Financial Times, 
December 28 2006. 
Toms, S. (2006) Asset Pricing Models, the Labour Theory of Value and their 
Implications for Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 17: 947-965. 
TTF (1999) Treasury Taskforce Guidance, Standardisation of PFI Contracts, London: 
HMSO. 
 27
Table 1: Proportion of the early PFI contracts with arrangements to share 
refinancing gains. 
 
Contracts let: Prior to June 2000 Year to June 2001 
Contracts with at 
least 50% share 
4% 4% 
Contacts with a 
share of 30% 
4% 23% 
Contacts with a 
share of less than 
30% 
18% 27% 
Total with some 
share of refinancing 
gains 
26% 54% 
Source: HM Treasury (2003), House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, PFI 
Refinancing Update, Twenty-second Report of Session 2002-3. 
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Table 2: PFI projects with high investor returns following refinancing. 
 
 Investor rate of 
return prior to 
refinancing 
Investor rate of 
return after 
refinancing 
Multiple increase 
in investor rate of 
returns on 
refinancing 
 
Debden Park 
School 
 
15.5% 71.3% 4.6 
Norfolk & 
Norwich 
Hospital 
 
16.0% 60.0% 3.75 
Bromley 
Hospital 
 
27.1% 70.5% 2.6 
Darren Valley 
Hospital 
 
23.0% 56.0% 2.44 
Source: HM Treasury (2007) House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, Update on PFI Debt 
Refinancing, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2006-7. 
 
